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Abstract
Background: Emergency planning in the UK has grown considerably in recent years, galvanised by the threat of
terrorism. However, deficiencies in NHS emergency planning were identified and the evidence-base that underpins
it is questionable. Inconsistencies in terminologies and concepts also exist. Different models of emergency
management exist internationally but the optimal system is unknown. This study examines the evidence-base and
evidence requirements for emergency planning in the UK health context.
Methods: The study involved semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders and opinion leaders. Purposive
sampling was used to obtain a breadth of views from various agencies involved in emergency planning and
response. Interviews were then analysed using a grounded approach using standard framework analysis techniques.
Results: We conducted 17 key informant interviews. Interviewees identified greater gaps in operational than
technical aspects of emergency planning. Social and behavioural knowledge gaps were highlighted with regards to
how individuals and organisations deal with risk and behave in emergencies. Evidence-based approaches to public
engagement and for developing community resilience to disasters are lacking. Other gaps included how
knowledge was developed and used. Conflicting views with regards to the optimal configuration and operation of
the emergency management system were voiced.
Conclusions: Four thematic categories for future research emerged:
(i) Knowledge-base for emergency management: Further exploration is needed of how knowledge is acquired,
valued, disseminated, adopted and retained.
(ii) Social and behavioural issues: Greater understanding of how individuals approach risk and behave in
emergencies is required.
(iii) Organisational issues in emergencies: Several conflicting organisational issues were identified; value of planning
versus plans, flexible versus standardized procedures, top-down versus bottom-up engagement, generic versus
specific planning, and reactive versus proactive approaches to emergencies.
(iv) Emergency management system: More study is required of system-wide issues relating to system configuration
and operation, public engagement, and how emergency planning is assessed.
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management
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Background
The UK experiences around 11 major incidents per
year [1]. These often require coordinated multi-agency
responses including from the National Health Service
(NHS). Previously, this work was conducted in the
background but the horrifying terrorist attacks of
11 September 2001 and 7 July 2005 have catapulted the
emergency management field up the political agenda [2].
Since then, research and publications in this field have
accelerated, as demonstrated by the US experience fol-
lowing 11 September 2011 where in the past decade
nearly seven hundred articles were published pertaining
to this single event alone [3].
Emergency management is often erroneously under-
stood as only those activities pertaining to the response
to an emergency situation. In its broadest sense however,
it is synonymous with emergency planning and encom-
passes a spectrum of activities from business continuity
management and planning, training and preparedness,
as well as the response to, and recovery from emergen-
cies. (Figure 1) [4,5] This was further codified in the
Civil Contingencies Act, 2004 that set out for the various
health agencies key responsibilities to prepare for major
incidents that included the assessment of local hazards
and risks, planning, training and testing activities [6,7].
However, deficiencies in NHS emergency planning
have been previously noted [3–6], and questions have
been raised as to the evidence-base that underpins much
of the activity of emergency planning for major incidents
[8]. Also lacking is an evidence-base to support planning
around longer-term “rising tide” incidents such as
infectious disease outbreaks, covert chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear events, and threats to infra-
structure, and business continuity, such as floods and
transport strikes. There are also inconsistencies in ter-
minologies and concepts used [9,10]. Different models of
emergency management exist worldwide that reflect the
situational contexts of the countries in which the systems
have evolved [6,11,12]. What is less clear is what systems
and processes work best.
We present the results from a study commissioned
by the National Institute for Health Research Service
Development Organisation to determine the evidence-
base for emergency planning, specifically for the UK
health context [13]. This project was a collaborative
partnership between academics, clinicians, public health
and health protection specialists. It consisted of 4 sub-
projects: a scoping study of the published literature, a
qualitative grey literature scoping review, key informant
interviews, and an e-Delphi study. Mixed methods were
employed in order to approach the topic holistically. We
report here the key issues and challenges for emergency
planning in health in the UK that were identified.
Methods
We sought to gather more detailed insight into the state
of emergency planning in health in the UK and any
research gaps. In order to do so, we chose a qualitative
approach, using semi-structured interviews with key
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Figure 1 The emergency management cycle. This figure illustrates the key stages of emergency management from mitigation, through to
preparedness (covering emergency planning, capability assessment and maintenance), emergency response and eventually recovery. This is
derived from the work of McLoughlin (1985) who detailed the various stages and how they are related in an ‘integrated emergency
management system’.
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stakeholders and opinion leaders acting as our key
informants.
Ethics approval for this study was sought and received
from the NHS Sheffield Research Ethics Committee
(REC Ref 10/H1308/67).
The sampling strategy adopted was purposive in order
to obtain a breadth of views from multi-agency stake-
holders. Initially, we identified a list of potential key
informants to interview. These individuals were selected
on the basis of their known expertise, recognized experi-
ence, or research in the field. They were identified
through the World Association for Disaster & Emergency
Medicine, the Department of Health Emergency Planning
Clinical Leaders Advisory Group, faculty of the Masters
course in Health Incident Command at Manchester
Metropolitan University, senior faculty of the Emergency
Planning College and the Health Protection Agency
(HPA). Public representation was also sought through the
Sheffield Emergency Care Forum, a group of interested
members of the public who are involved in providing a
public voice, interest or lay representation in research in
Sheffield.
Potential participants were initially contacted by tele-
phone, e-mail, and/or letter, with summary information
on the project. Those participants who agreed to take
part in the project were provided with participant in-
formation leaflets and returned a signed consent form
or correspondence agreeing to participate. A mutually
agreed date, time and venue were then set for the
interviews. The interviews were carried out either face-
to-face or by telephone depending on the wishes of
the respondents.
Of 50 potential key informants identified, twenty-
seven were approached and invited to interview. Of this
number, 17 key informants agreed to be interviewed.
The reason for non-participation by key informants
invited who decline interview is not known as this infor-
mation was not collected. The participants included a
range of individuals who in their professional capacities
included emergency planners, health managers, policy-
makers, technical experts and scientific advisors.
(Table 1) There was representation from the public, pri-
vate sector, the military, primary and secondary care,
ambulance service, civil service, and the HPA. Some
interviewees operated at the frontline locally, whilst
others participated at more senior levels in government
as well as internationally. We are confident that a broad
and appropriate range of informants were included and
covered.
The interview schedule was developed from our pre-
liminary conceptual mapping and scoping of the litera-
ture done as part of the wider study [13]. The schedule
consisted of several broad themes to be explored that
included those themes we had identified as potential
issues. An iterative approach was adopted and the inter-
view guide was modified over the course of the project
to explore emergent themes that had not been identified
a priori.
Interviews were carried out initially by two researchers
together to standardise the interview process and for
Table 1 Profiles of the key informants interviewed
Interviewee Practitioner Technical expert Scientific or academic expert Policymaker Member of the public
A √
B √
C √ √
D √
E √
F √ √
G √
H √
I √
J √
K √ √
L √ √ √
M √ √ √
N √ √
O √
P √
Q √
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familiarisation with the process. Subsequent interviews
were conducted by the researchers individually. Both
researchers were dually experienced as academics as
well as in the field of emergency planning. This was
considered important as it would help facilitate discus-
sions that could be technical in nature. The researchers
were mindful throughout of the potential for observer
bias in view of their previous expertise and experience
in this field and how this could influence their inter-
pretation of findings. To mitigate this, periodic discus-
sions between the researchers were held to compare
and contrast findings.
Most of the interviews were carried out face-to-face
either at the participants’ workplace or at a university
venue to suit the participants’ convenience. A small pro-
portion of interviews were conducted over the telephone
as agreed with the interviewees in advance. Interviews
were recorded using digital audio recorders and tran-
scribed verbatim with the participant’s informed consent.
Concurrent notes were also made during the course of
the interviews. Quotes were anonymised to protect the
identities of participants.
Data from interviews were then analysed using a mix
of thematic analysis to explore and describe issues and
themes, as well as using a constant comparison grounded
approach to try and identify a conceptual framework.
After familiarisation with the material, coding was under-
taken. This utilised several variants of coding that
included descriptive coding, in vivo coding, and versus
coding approaches [14]. We were especially interested in
trying to identify contrasting views from respondents or
issues raised where there were tensions or uncertainty.
The codes were then categorized and amalgamated into
higher level thematic categories, and re-iterated as new
codes where appropriate. These were then mapped out
to display their linkages.
Results
From the key informant interviews we identified 4 emer-
gent thematic categories relevant to emergency planning
in health (Figure 2):
(i) the knowledge (or evidence-) base for emergency
planning,
(ii) how individuals and organisations react and behave
in emergencies,
(iii) the healthcare system in which the emergency
management occurs, and
(iv) issues related to the public served by the system.
The knowledge base
Many issues were raised pertaining to various aspects of
the knowledge base for emergency management. Firstly,
there was an issue of how knowledge was acquired.
Unlike traditional biomedical science where knowledge
is built up from research, this was not the case for emer-
gency management. Due to the unpredictability of emer-
gencies, and the inherent slowness in current research
commissioning processes, the status quo does not facili-
tate the accumulation of research-based knowledge.
“It’s very difficult to, you can’t do a randomised control
trial. You can’t compare because every situation is
very different.”
(Emergency Planning Technical Expert 1)
“Emergency planning is an unusual area . . . If you do
sort of medical research you test your hypothesis and
then you sort of devise the treatment or devise a drug
and you test it etc. Emergency planning is nothing like
that at all.”
(Emergency Planning Policymaker 2)
“Those quick response reports (research in the US) are
then published online for people to see, so you can see
what is happening and there is this much more “joined
up” thinking between government and research and
the practitioner in the United States. National Science
Foundation funds an awful lot of work in disasters and
emergency management, which we do not do here.”
(Emergency Planning Academic and Technical Expert 1)
There were inter-professional differences in how the
existing knowledge is viewed, valued and used, as well as
the “appetite” for evidence. “Blue light” emergency ser-
vices practitioners equated experience of dealing with
incidents with expertise and as evidence. In contrast,
stakeholders from a health background (e.g. medicine
and nursing) valued “knowledge” that had been peer-
reviewed and published.
“You’ve got with a lot of practitioners this brick wall
that you have to kick them through so that they can
open their eyes you know. It’s very much ‘Why do I
need to know that? What’s that gonna help me? Why
should I read a book about the way disasters may
happen or about social vulnerability? What will that
do for me in terms of helping respond to an
emergency?’”
(Emergency Planning Academic and Technical Expert 1)
“Well a lot of people (emergency planners and
managers) don’t see the relevance (of evidence) or how
it can be done.”
(Emergency Planning Technical Expert 2)
“. . .the difference in cultures and the like and the
knowledge and evidence it comes out of the culture
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aspects of how (the different organisations) do it. Some
are sort of disorganised . . . This is part of the problem
I’ve noticed in the exercises we’ve had as to what each
see as the evidence they need and how they approach it.”
(Public representative 3)
There were also differences in how the knowledge
was valued; the former valued practical “knowledge”
more than academic literature for example. The degree
to which information was scrutinized also differed.
Emergency planning practitioners tended to be less
critical of their information sources, accepting them at
‘face value’.
“People talk about stuff as if this is the way we did it
and therefore it’s right when that is simply anecdotes
or based on experience. It hasn’t been evaluated
independently and found to be something that is
applicable universally in other situations . . . The
evidence base is only anecdotal and perhaps that’s
symptomatic of the field itself . . . To me it reflects the
fact that what people take as quality assured
knowledge is different from what they may just glean
from all sorts of different sources. The question is how
far they actually can judge what is good quality
information and procedures and what is just what
they have picked up from somewhere else . . .”
(Emergency Planning Academic and Technical Expert 2)
This raises the issue of not just how practitioners ac-
quire knowledge, but also how they may sufficiently
discern its credibility and value. Consequently, the use
of evidence in emergency planning, as one respondent
describes, is “often patchy and impoverished”.
There were also issues with how knowledge was trans-
ferred from academia to practitioners, how it is cascaded
within organisations and communicated between organi-
sations. Problems with these ‘knowledge transactions’
often hinder the dissemination of knowledge. In turn,
the knowledge needed to be adopted and implemented,
as well as retained within organisations, and again pro-
blems were reported. This also includes issues with how
knowledge is contextualised and occasionally mis-
applied to local situations.
“We don’t share our research with our practitioners
in a good way. . . . (We need to) develop that
mechanism for knowledge exchange . . .
It’s getting the knowledge out there about what
happens, why it happens, making people aware.”
(Emergency Planning Academic and Technical Expert 1)
“A lot of people do research in this area and then are
very frustrated that they don’t get their research into
policy practice because they actually don’t share it
with the people who need to know what’s there because
they don’t know how to share it.”
Figure 2 Summary of thematic categories identified. The key thematic categories identified include the knowledge-base used for emergency
management, individual and organisational behaviour, health care system issues and matters relating to the public in crisis/disaster situations.
This figure further maps out the major themes linked with each category. Under the knowledge-base, it includes issues of how knowledge is
acquired, appraised, disseminated, adopted and retained. The category of behaviour in emergencies includes decision-making, organisational
behaviour in crisis as well as risk management. Health care system issues cover organisational set up and configuration of the emergency
management system, process issues of how the system operates, implementation challenges, as well as problems with how outcomes are
identified and measured in emergencies. The final category, the public dimension, covers public attitudes and expectations, communication with
the public, public engagement and the development of community resilience.
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(Emergency Planning Technical Expert and
Policymaker)
Another concern was the difficulty of maintaining or-
ganisational memory of lessons learnt from previous
incidents. The need for an easily accessible repository of
knowledge was identified which is currently lacking.
“. . . in wanting to get messages across or work with
people, you know when you are working with different
kinds of people, like in the academic and the
practitioner world, you have to move over to their
world. Think of the world through their eyes and
communicate in the way that they will hear and
if you can’t do that, then no matter how good your
research is, it is not relevant to them . . . The thing
that worries me most at the moment is having a
corporate memory . . . a way of capturing knowledge,
sharing knowledge . . . That is one thing that we are
rapidly losing . . . knowledge and understanding and
people re-inventing wheels. They say we haven't done
this before and you say you have, you just don't know
about it.”
(Emergency Planning Academic and Technical Expert 2)
“. . . these settings are so far and few between and
therefore lessons learnt are often forgotten until the
next time . . .”
(Health Technical Expert)
Behaviour in emergencies
Most respondents were less troubled with technical know-
ledge gaps, but more concerned with social and behav-
ioural science gaps. There is a lack of understanding of
how individuals (both the public and providers) behave in
emergencies. Neither is it known what constitutes good
decision-making or good leadership in an emergency.
“I would give (research funding priority) to the
social scientists . . . to understand a bit more of
why in a crisis individuals and organisations behave
as they do. To get under the skin of what goes well
and what doesn’t go well in emergency health
response . . . Something a bit deeper, something
that can you know, tackle issues of power, implied
power, command, control and locus of control and
kind of stuff that maybe a kind of a hard, hard nosed
physical scientist would say is all a bit woolly but
in actual fact I think it’s probably quite fundamental
to this.”
(Scientific and Technical Expert)
“(The big gaps are) around behavioural sciences
because I think when we do the major exercises there’s
often the lack of understanding of how people actually
react in emergencies or incidents . . . We really don’t
understand how the public will react to (a disaster) if
it happens.”
(Emergency Planning Technical Expert 2)
Closely associated with individual and organisational
behaviours are the different organisational cultures that
exist and the manifestations of inter-professional culture
clashes. There are marked variations in the different
agencies’ understanding of risks, the situation, how they
communicate, react, respond to, recover and learn from
incidents.
It was also observed that the current approach to emer-
gencies in the UK tends to be reactive, less pre-planned,
with decision-makers tending to “muddle through” situa-
tions until their eventual resolution. It is overly focussed
on the “response” phase with less attention paid to other
aspects such as mitigation and recovery. It was also noted
that practitioners tended to make assumptions that feed
into the emergency planning process. This introduces
potential vulnerabilities into emergency plans, prepara-
tions and subsequent responses.
“We do sometimes tend to say we’re good at this.
We’ve done so many but we’re good at all this and
I’m not so sure we are . . . You’ve got to be very honest
with yourself and be very careful that you don’t
over-estimate your own knowledge and your own skills.
Just because you’ve dealt with this in the past does not
necessarily mean that you’ve done the right thing. It
may just mean that you’ve got away with it!”
(Health Technical Expert and Policymaker)
“I don’t think there was a plan and certainly it wasn’t
kind of thought through and implemented that
systematically. It seemed to me there were plenty of
resources thrown at the problem but (the response)
happened despite not having a plan rather than
because there was a plan.”
(Scientific and Technical Expert)
“We make a lot of our planning here based on a lot of
assumptions which really haven’t been thought
through.”
(Emergency Planning Academic and Technical Expert 1)
Of special note was how risks are perceived differently
by individuals and agencies. The occupational backgrounds
of the individuals involved in particular influenced risk per-
ception. There was also conflicting and varying “sensitivity”
to risk; some agencies were better prepared for known
threats than the unexpected ones, whereas others para-
doxically became less reactive to familiar threats.
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“I think to that we have possibly focused a little bit on
the wrong end of things and very much on the "Big
bang" high profile emergencies and less on the less, the
sort of "slow burn" or things like winter preparedness,
planning for winter. . . I think the fact that many
emergency planners were recruited from the Forces
and they . . . tended to be driven by "Big bang", what I
call "Big bang" events, and therefore they tend to plan
for "Big bang" events, whereas the sort of events that
might really bring the health service down like a very
bad winter or a very bad outbreak . . . or a
combination of that and IT failure were less likely to
be planned for.”
(Emergency Planning Academic and Technical Expert 1)
Another problem was how risk is communicated to
other agencies, policymakers and the public, as well as
how the different agencies respond to risk. Health orga-
nisations were more risk averse and tended to “play safe”
and “over-react” to threats compared to the other emer-
gency responders.
“The trouble is around risk assessment, the perception
or risks and understanding of risks. There’s a massive role
for academia there. There’s language around risk, there’s
a language around perception of risk and communication
of risk that we need to be able to bring in more to help
the general public understand what they’re faced with
and how they see risk and how we communicate risk.”
(Emergency Planning Policymaker 2)
Health care system issues
Several themes related to systems-level issues were also
identified. Different emergency management systems
exist worldwide and it is not known how well the differ-
ent systems perform relative to one another. Neither
was there a way of gauging the performance of each sys-
tem. What is clear is that there are socio-political con-
textual specificities that influence the organisation,
function and effectiveness of the various emergency
management systems.
“I’ve been to Australia and Holland looking at some of
the stuff that they do on emergency planning and the
cultures are so different in terms of the expectations of
the population, of the public services, the extent to
which the public are involved in planning and you
know the split of responsibilities between the
individuals and the community themselves and the
public sector is often so different that it’s quite difficult.
The political systems are often so different.”
(Emergency Planning Technical Expert 1)
“We tend to see the science base as evidence base says
X therefore X is right. But actually X may not be right
in different circumstances because the evidence base
was developed in different circumstances. And we need
to be a bit more flexible and also to recognise that you
know if you make a decision in the absence of
information your decision may be different when you
get the information.”
(Emergency Planning Technical Expert 2)
In the UK, it was also observed that there is a lack of
understanding of the role of the health service by the
health service in emergency planning. Much of it tended
to be focused on operational response aspects, and
there is a perceived lack of a strategic “whole systems
approach” to emergencies. Recovery issues in particular
tended to be neglected.
“The NHS is the last organisation to “switch on” . . .
The NHS deals poorly with uncertainty.”
(Health Emergency Planning Manager 3)
“Everybody is now so risk averse that everything’s got
to be so detailed in its planning that actually we’re
moving towards a hiatus. The senior directors of all
sorts of companies and organisations are then feeling
hamstrung or blinded by ‘Get me a plan on X, Y
and Z” ‘cos this is what’s happened. But actually it’s
not X, Y, Z that’s happened; it’s something that falls
in-between.”
(Emergency Planning Policymaker 1)
There were tensions and conflicting views as to the
right approach to emergency management. Is it better to
have generic or specific plans, a flexible approach to a situ-
ation or strict adherence to plans and pre-set measures, or,
a top-down or bottom-up approach to the conduct of the
response? There was also a disconnect between those who
wrote plans and those who implemented them which con-
sequently meant that what was planned did not always
match what was eventually implemented.
“My own personal experience of the pandemic are that
plans are nothing, planning is everything. So did I once
refer to the DH pandemic plan during my roles in the
pandemic? No. Did I once ever see that document out
on a table during the pandemic itself? No. Do I think
that matters? No, I don’t because I think the plan was
a living embodiment of the fact that the planning had
taken place. . .”
(Scientific and Technical Expert)
“I think you need to have a system that’s flexible, but
how flexible?”
(Health Technical Expert and Policymaker)
“I think the only way to manage a large incident has
to be SOPs, protocol-based as to what you were going
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to do and of course for a lot of this you are going to be
doing things that you wouldn’t normally do you
know. . .So I think, I would tend to be in the inflexible
group. I think the only way you can manage a big
incident is by having very rigid protocols and driving
that forward. . . I think one has to be absolutely rigid
to manage this in everyone’s best interest.”
(Health Technical Expert)
“It’s probably difficult to square in a sort of
non-military role but how do you get people who are
leaders into a job that’s not always dealing with
conflict, has to mix between . . . You’ve got to crack on
and put some form of command and control in for this
particular moment in time but actually the majority
of your time’s spent cajoling, encouraging and taking
on board stakeholder agreement and consensus . . .
getting there eventually but not quite in the fashion
that you want it.”
(Emergency Planning Policymaker 1)
Furthermore, whilst an integrated response is desired,
in reality the various organisations involved usually oper-
ate independently in silos and the wider health system
response is insufficiently integrated. Civil society organi-
sations are often marginalised as well. Health organisations
tended to be slow and resistant to change. In addition, they
were less familiar with dealing with emergency situations
and were more focused on their routine workload.
Public issues
It was felt that the public in the UK did not understand
emergency planning and opportunities for the public to
engage in emergency planning were limited. There was
a perception that the public expected an external
agency to protect them and provide for them in
emergencies.
“The public really want to be sure that things are
happening and they are going to be sorted out and
looked after and made safe if anything goes wrong.”
(Public representative 3)
Some interviewees described this as a “culture of de-
pendency” and there was a shared concern that there are
unrealistic public expectations of what the emergency
services can do in an emergency. Although greater
shared decision-making and public engagement seems
to be sought, the stakeholders involved did not appear
to know how best to achieve this. Similarly, whilst there
was a lot of discussion of the concept of community re-
silience and an understanding that public engagement
was key, there was again a lack of clarity as to what
“meaningful engagement” entailed.
“I think the most consistent lessons learned from all
these things is about failure to communicate both
between responding agencies and with the public, and
one would have to assume that if that keeps recurring
as a regular theme in lessons learnt then there is
probably a question in there that hasn’t been properly
answered.”
(Emergency Planning Technical Expert 2)
“I think we are moving towards a culture of more of
an understanding of human behaviour and trusting
the public and all of that. But that’s filtered through
political priorities and you know the facilities around
sharing information and sharing decision-making and
the political interpretation. . .”
(Emergency Planning Academic and Technical Expert 2)
“Getting the public involved with some of these
processes would be a good thing to do. In the absence
of a science base . . . at least we would have a different
perspective on the problem rather than the
assumptions made by experts and planners.”
(Emergency Planning Technical Expert 2)
“Engagement is difficult. (If ) there is no obvious way
how you can influence (things), you don’t get involved
and because we don’t get involved you know it’s kind of
a vicious circle and by changing that and making it
into a virtuous circle potentially you could begin to
help change that.”
(Emergency Planning Technical Expert 1)
Discussion
Summary of study findings
Four interconnected thematic domains were identified
around the knowledge-base for emergency planning,
how individuals and organisations react and behave in
emergencies, the health care system in which the emer-
gency management occurs, and the public served by the
system. (Figure 3) For example, decision-making by
emergency managers was to some extent based on the
available evidence-base, but heavily influenced by the
individuals’ experiences and professional backgrounds.
This in turn was affected by the organisational cultures
in which the individuals worked in and the set up of the
healthcare system. The decisions subsequently impact
on the intended beneficiary, the public. However, the
public is not a static entity but a dynamic living commu-
nity of individuals who themselves perceive and react to
the socio-political environment [15]. Emergency man-
agement therefore cannot be seen in isolation in its indi-
vidual components, but should ideally be addressed
holistically at a systems level.
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What is already known
There is a considerable body of literature and ongoing
research worldwide on emergency management from
both developed and developing countries [13,16]. Much
of it is from North America pertaining particularly to
emergency preparedness and response, and on hazard-
specific topics such as countermeasures to terrorism,
flood warning systems and earthquake prediction, or the
application of technologies such as geographical infor-
mation systems. Literature on organisational issues such
as incident command system set-up however is uncom-
mon. Neither is there much on knowledge management
and learning from disasters, or performance manage-
ment including the measurement of effectiveness or effi-
ciency of response. A better understanding of how
individuals approach risk and behave in emergencies, as
well as means of strengthening community resilience
have been identified as knowledge gaps.
We found that the evidence-base used for emergency
planning in the UK was fragmented and its robustness
inconsistent as has been reported elsewhere [8,13,16].
The application of the evidence-base is also reported to
be patchy [3–5], and decision-making tends to be
dependent on the individual and organisational culture
of the agencies involved [13]. This was clearly exempli-
fied by the current approach of emergency planning
practitioners tending to “muddle through” situations,
often relying on their previous experience and intuition,
rather than any robust evidence base or understanding
of the wider socio-political or behavioural aspects. Indeed,
past experience from previous inquiries into disasters is
of lessons not learnt and mistakes being repeated [17,18].
What is therefore called for is a professional culture shift
towards a much more evidence-based approach to
emergency management [8]. There is a vital need to
embed learning from past events and knowledge into
current practice as well as identifying mechanisms that
would ensure organisational memory is not lost
[19,20].
Our study also reiterates current gaps in the under-
standing of how individuals behave in emergency situa-
tions, both at the individual as well as the community
and organisational levels [21–23]. Assumptions are often
made in the planning process as to how individuals will
react that are insufficiently grounded in an evidence
base. This may have a significant bearing on how events
unfold and eventual outcomes of the emergency situ-
ation. There is also a tendency to disregard knowledge
from sources outside the UK as irrelevant to the local
context [13]. This view ignores a substantial body of
knowledge on emergency planning from around the
world, and in particular the United States [13,16]. In
addition to learning from UK sources, the assimilation
and synthesis of knowledge from abroad would help
build up the evidence-base and address knowledge gaps.
What this study adds
There is a risk that studies of emergency planning
are carried out in detail at a microscopic level. Such
deconstruction of the system to its component parts may
insufficiently address many of the issues and challenges
encountered in reality where the response to an emer-
gency is by the “system” as a whole. Furthermore, the
emergency management cycle (Figure 1) should be exam-
ined in its entirety and not be restricted to the response
phase only [12]. Indeed, recovery and mitigation issues
are frequently overlooked [13,16]. There are various
issues specific to these other phases, such as psychosocial
trauma, community cohesion, and the health impacts of
poorly managed incidents that are often inadequately
documented and studied [24].
Numerous questions remain unanswered such as the
optimal configuration of the emergency management
system or its approach to disaster situations: flexible or
standardized, top-down or bottom-up, reactive or pro-
active, generic versus specific planning [21]. Does the
current system enable or disable responders? Neither is
it clear how the performance of the system can be mea-
sured [25,26]. For example, what would constitute “a
good recovery”? It may be the case that there is no for-
mulaic response to disasters that is guaranteed to work
in all settings but what would be sought is a system that
is able to apply a blend of approaches to maximise the
likelihood of a good outcome.
It is also uncertain how the public in the UK socio-
political setting can be meaningfully engaged in emer-
gency management. Currently the relationship between
practitioners, the emergency management system and
The Knowledge Base
Individual and 
Organisational 
Behaviour 
Health Care System
The Public
Figure 3 Key thematic categories identified. The key themes
identified by the study group naturally into 4 distinct thematic
categories: the knowledge-base used for emergency management,
individual and organisational behaviour, health care system issues
and matters relating to the public in crisis/disaster situations. These
thematic categories are not independent but show considerable
overlap as illustrated in this Venn diagram.
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the public appears to be less than ideal. Public involve-
ment tends to be minimal and tokenistic and this is rein-
forced by an emergency management system and
culture that is disempowering [2]. Furthermore, the “fail-
ure to communicate” with the public has been identified
as a recurrent issue from emergencies and exercises
[21]. It would be beneficial to better understand why this
failure to communicate occurs and how it might be rec-
tified. As evidence from elsewhere indicates, community
resilience and community-based disaster risk reduction
can only be achieved through meaningful engagement
and empowerment of the community [24,27].
Limitations of the study
This study was an exploration of emergency planning
issues in the UK context and its transferability to other
contexts may therefore be limited without appropriate
interpretation. The study respondents were predomin-
antly current practitioners in the field of emergency
planning. Consequently, their views may not fully reflect
the wider discourse that includes academic and political
perspectives. That said, the majority of respondents were
of considerable seniority within their respective organi-
sations and were able to draw on insights not just from
the operational end but also from the tactical and stra-
tegic perspectives of emergency planning.
Conclusion
In conclusion, numerous issues have been identified
where there is value in exploring further. There is a need
to build a UK evidence-base founded on robust research
of individual, population, organisational and system-level
themes in emergency planning. This evidence needs to
be translated into action and embedded into organisa-
tions with the ultimate aim of developing a health sys-
tem and community that is resilient to disasters.
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